Different Scenarios and Strategic Assessments
Introduction:
The process of a peaceful transition from the Islamic Republic of Iran is a delicate, complex, and at the same time, dangerous phenomenon. The path for our country to move from the dictatorship of the Supreme Leader—or more accurately, the current “half-hearted and catastrophic democracy”—towards a form of Western-style liberal democracy that is adapted to our local context is not merely a domestic issue. Rather, it is a multi-faceted phenomenon with international, regional, security, and geopolitical dimensions. This transition may have unpredictable consequences. The aim of this analysis is to outline the potential scenarios for this transition, along with examining the costs, opportunities, threats, and key players involved in each scenario.
Necessary Elements for a Realistic Analysis:
To avoid oversimplifying the current complex situation, our analysis must be multilayered and grounded in reality. Below, five key factors that can influence the transition to democracy are discussed:
- Examining the internal legitimacy of the Islamic Republic:
Over the past 47 years—especially in recent years—the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic has faced widespread challenges from various social groups. From the Green Movement (“Where is my vote?”) in 2009 to the Women, Life, Freedom movement in 2022, and from the professional demands of nurses, retirees, workers, and bazaar merchants (often met with repression), the regime’s legitimacy has been severely weakened. The government tries to project an image of street-level legitimacy by mobilizing religious crowds during events like Ashura and Tasoua, exaggerating popular participation. However, the very low voter turnout in the recent presidential election (with Dr. Pezeshkian as a candidate), even according to official data, reveals a dramatic decline in public trust in the Islamic system.
- The maturity of civil movements and social capital as a pillar of success for peaceful democratic transition:
In any dictatorship, a vibrant civil society and strong social capital are essential tools for victory. In Iran, despite security pressures, a combination of civil activists, labor unions, political actors, women, students, and teachers have managed to keep the discourse of civic demands and civil resistance alive to some extent. However, the fragmentation of these forces, the lack of organizational cohesion, and the constant threats, conspiracies, and suppression by the regime have temporarily diminished their effectiveness.
Building the capacity for networking, organizing, training, managing protests, and leveraging new media tools can help strengthen and empower this potential.
3. The role of the armed forces and security apparatus:
The stance of the armed forces—especially the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)—will be critical in any political transformation. If parts of the regime’s security-military body defect or become neutral, the chances for a nonviolent transition will dramatically increase. Conversely, a united military and IRGC leadership around the Supreme Leader strengthens the scenario of harsh crackdowns. Historical experiences in the Soviet Union and Chile show that the military’s role during crises can determine whether social movements or revolutions succeed.
For those placing their hopes in the army, it must be said: the Iranian army, due to the appointment of loyal and senior officers transferred from the Revolutionary Guards, has become even more disappointing and corrupt than the IRGC itself.
4. The interests of foreign actors and the sensitivity of neighbors:
Iran’s geopolitical location has made it a focal point for global powers and regional states, all of whom are highly sensitive to any political change in the country. The United States, Israel, Russia, China, the European Union, and Middle Eastern states each have their own specific interests and will behave differently depending on the transition scenario. Additionally, neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan may also influence the democratic transition process due to their concerns over potential instability in Iran.
Capacity for Institution-Building and the Risk of Collapse or Gradual Transition:
One of the major challenges during the transition period is the presence or absence of alternative institutions to govern the country. If the transition happens quickly without the necessary infrastructure—such as new institutions—there is an increased risk of collapse and chaos. Conversely, if the transition is gradual and based on elite consensus and the participation of civil and legal institutions, there is a greater chance of forming a more stable democratic political system.
As mentioned above, despite its authoritarian structure, Iran does have institutions with relative capacity for transformation—such as a semi-active civil society, educated elites, an experienced bureaucracy, independent media, and social networks that play an awareness-raising role during crises. If these capacities are coordinated, they can help pave the way for a gradual and controlled transition to democracy. On the other hand, continued repression, the absence of accountable institutions, and the rift between the people and the government increase the risk of structural collapse and general disorder, which could lead to severe insecurity.
If the transition process lacks focused leadership, effective planning, and institutional strategies, there is a risk of the government falling into a “power vacuum” similar to what occurred in Libya and Syria.
Influential Players in the Transition Equation:
United States:
The United States has consistently pursued three main approaches towards the Islamic Republic of Iran: containment, maximum pressure, and conditional engagement. These approaches have shifted over recent decades, influenced by changes in U.S. administrations and the geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East.
Generally, Republican administrations have been more inclined to use pressure tools, economic sanctions, and international isolation to weaken Iran’s ruling structures. In contrast, Democratic administrations, as seen with President Obama, have sometimes favored conditional engagement, exemplified by the JCPOA nuclear deal. However, both parties share strategic goals—namely preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and preserving U.S. interests in the region—regardless of whether it’s under the Shah’s regime or the Islamic Republic.
Despite common perceptions that Republicans are more hostile towards Iran, it cannot be definitively stated that one party has inflicted more damage on Iran than the other. Republicans may act more overtly hostile, but Democratic administrations’ covert pressures and policies have at times caused deeper damage to Iran’s economy and internal politics. Additionally, some analysts argue that Republican administrations have, at certain points, supported relative political stability and Iran’s territorial integrity to avoid a complete regional collapse. However, these supports have always been guided by U.S. geopolitical interests, not necessarily out of empathy for the Iranian people.
Overall, U.S. policy towards Iran, regardless of which party is in power, is defined by the preservation of American security, economic, and geopolitical interests—rather than genuine concern for stability or change in Iran’s power structures
Israel: (Neutralizing Military-Nuclear Threats)
Israel’s primary concern is not whether Iran is a democracy or a dictatorship, but rather neutralizing any military or nuclear threat that could jeopardize its existence. Tel Aviv’s policy relies on intelligence pre-emption, targeted operations, and extensive lobbying, especially in the United States. In the event of an uncontrolled collapse in Iran, Israel would be concerned about the increased influence of proxy or extremist groups near its northern borders and in Iraq.
Russia and China: (Opposition to Liberal Democratic Transition)
Russia and China, due to their geopolitical and economic interests, oppose sudden and even liberal transitions in Iran. Moscow and Beijing see Iran as a strategic partner in their competition with the West and view democratic transition in Iran as a threat that could weaken their influence and open the door for Western expansion into the region. They support controlled authoritarian models of governance in Iran.
European Union: (Support for Reforms with Regional Stability)
The European Union, while generally more diplomatic than the United States, prioritizes regional stability, reducing migration, and preventing Middle East destabilization. Although it officially supports democracy and human rights, in practice, it places greater emphasis on gradual reforms and maintaining Iran’s territorial integrity. The EU’s role could be pivotal in mediating and facilitating Iran’s transition to democracy.
Persian Gulf States: (Fear of a Democratic but Strong Iran)
The south Persian Gulf countries worry about two scenarios: one is a collapsed, unstable Iran that would export crises and terrorism, and the other is a democratic Iran with genuine legitimacy and public support that would reclaim its real position in the Middle East. While they have covertly and openly supported the weakening of the Islamic Republic, they also fear the emergence of a popular, anti-monarchical government aligned with the awakening movements within their own borders.
Turkey and the Caucasus: (Balance of Power and Cultural/Military Influence)
Erdogan’s Turkey is seeking to exploit a power vacuum in Iran to expand its cultural, economic, and military influence in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Sunni areas. In the Caucasus, the rivalry among Iran, Turkey, and Russia makes any political change in Tehran a potential geopolitical opportunity or threat, drawing intense attention. Ankara is likely to support a conditional and gradual transition in Iran, as long as current borders remain intact and the balance of power shifts in its favor.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia: (Security and Ethnic Concerns)
Instability in Iran, particularly in the eastern regions, could lead to infiltration by terrorist groups, increased migration, and ethnic tensions among these countries. Pakistan is worried about security implications in Balochistan and India’s growing influence in Chabahar and Konarak ports.
In Afghanistan, Iran’s collapse could trigger an influx of migrants across the border and reduce vital exports to Afghanistan. Central Asian countries, too, have ties with Tajik and Turkmen minorities in Iran, which could become sources of tension. Turkmen communities live in Bandar-e-Turkmen, Gorgan, Maraveh Tappeh, and Raz and Jargalan in Bojnord, maintaining cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties across Iran’s borders. Moreover, the Marxist People’s Movement of the Turkmen remains a “smoldering ember” in these areas.
Transition Scenarios
A. Violent Collapse and Civil War
Indicators: Popular disobedience without centralized leadership, splits in the military, weakened institutions, and foreign intervention could push the regime towards total collapse. Socioeconomic and psychological conditions in the country are already ripe for this outcome.
Consequences: Ethnic separatism, religious conflicts, and migration and refugee crises are likely outcomes. Government institutions would fall apart, paving the way for civil war and the rise of militias in every region.
Comparable Cases: Syria and Libya are clear examples of this scenario. The collapse of Gaddafi’s central government led to chaos, proxy wars, and endless foreign interventions, with no short-term prospects for resolution.
B. Controlled Transition from Above
Indicators: Some regime elites, to preserve their own interests, may reluctantly agree to limited reforms and a step-by-step transfer of power to elected institutions—under external pressure and worsening domestic conditions.
Consequences: Power is transferred gradually, while military and clerical elites secure immunity and preserve core regime structures.
Risks: Repressive institutions might survive, transitional justice could be sacrificed to political expediency, and public disillusionment may lead to a sense of national frustration.
C. Popular Uprising Accompanied by Regime Defection
Indicators: Alignment of the fragmented and diverse Iranian opposition inside and outside the country, nationwide strikes within Iran—including among workers in oil and petrochemical companies—splits within the armed forces on one hand, and international community support on the other, can pave the way for transition.
Consequences: Power would transfer to a temporary political council representing diverse groups, new structures would emerge, and rapid institution-building would begin. However, this scenario is only possible if the Iranian opposition achieves alignment and unity.
Risks: The current clear absence of cohesive leadership, the risk of foreign intervention, or the rise of opportunistic militias.
National Reconciliation with Guaranteed Power Transition
Indicators: Elite consensus both inside and outside the regime, UN or neutral-country mediation, global pressure, and civil society consensus could form the foundation for reconciliation.
Benefits: Avoiding violence, maintaining national cohesion, reducing regional risks, and enabling a gradual, legally-framed transition.
Preconditions: Wise leadership on both sides of the conflict, a clear roadmap, and free elections under international supervision.
Determinants for Realizing Any Scenario:
The realization of any scenario depends on a combination of factors: the presence of legitimate and coordinated leadership within the country; the unity of the Iranian opposition abroad; fractures within the Islamic Republic’s ruling apparatus; the role of regional and international actors; the economic situation; and the high level of public discontent. Additionally, the preparedness of alternative institutions to fill any power vacuum will determine the success or failure of each scenario.
Summary and Preliminary Recommendation:
The transition to democracy in Iran is neither an inevitable nor a risk-free process. This path requires political maturity among elites, social solidarity, intelligent management of the process and transition period, and structural support from regional and global players. The crucial role of transitional management must not be overlooked. While the fall of the regime is important, the creation of alternative institutions and management of conflicts will determine future success.
Along this path, the formation of consensus-building institutions, synergy with neutral countries and international organizations, and the development of a shared national narrative for an “Iran after the Islamic Republic” are essential.
Malek Sabet Ebrahimi
May 23, 2025 (3 Khordad 1404, Solar Hijri Calendar)
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